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Abstract: The emergence of Next Generation Networks (NGNs) raises profound 
challenges for regulators everywhere. Different regulatory authorities have approached 
these problems in strikingly different ways, depending in part on the overall regulatory 
milieu in which they operate, and in part on the nature of the NGN migration envisioned by 
major market players. Also, the NGN core network raises significantly different issues from 
those of the NGN access network. The migration to NGN raises many of the same issues 
that were already on the table as a result of the broader migration to IP-based services, 
notably in regard to the de-coupling of the service from the underlying network. To these 
concerns are added profound questions related to the nature of market power. Will NGNs 
enable new forms of competition? Will competitive bottlenecks remain, especially in the 
last mile? Will NGN enable new forms of bottlenecks to emerge, especially in the upper 
layers of the network, perhaps as a result of new IMS capabilities? Regulators in the UK, 
Netherlands, Germany, Japan and the United States have been forced to deal with these 
issues due to relatively rapid migration to NGNs proposed by their respective incumbent 
telecoms operators. Many of the same issues are also visible in the recommendations that 
the European Commission finalised on 13 November 2007 as part of the ongoing review 
of the European regulatory framework for electronic communications. In this paper, we 
compare and contrast the many regulatory proceedings that have been produced by these 
regulatory authorities. 
Key words: Regulation; Next Generation Networks; access network; core network; all-IP; 
competition; market power; international comparison. 
 
echnological and market forces are driving network operators and 
electronic communication service providers throughout the world to 
migrate their networks to new network architectures which are based 
on the Internet Protocol (IP) 1. In most of the world, the resultant networks 
are referred to as "Next Generation Networks" (NGNs). In the United States, 
people more often speak of convergence rather than of NGN, but the 
technological and market drivers are essentially the same. 
                     
1 IETF, Internet Protocol: Darpa Internet Program Protocol Specification, RFC 791, September 
1981. 
T 
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At an abstract level, one might imagine that a change in underlying 
technology would have little impact on regulation 2; however, this evolution 
to NGN implies substantial changes throughout the entire value chain of 
electronic communications service provision, and thus implies significant 
challenges for regulators. Different regulators in different countries are 
finding somewhat different solutions to these challenges. 
NGNs can be viewed as comprising an "NGN access network" and an 
"NGN core" 3. The "Internet Protocol" (IP) is central to both. 
NGN access in the fixed network is initially broadband access (based on 
the copper loops between the Main Distribution Frame (MDF) and the end 
user's home), but is in the process of being enhanced over time in many 
countries to provide higher speed using fibre-based technology such as 
"Very High Speed DSL" (VDSL; Fiber–to-the-Cabinet, FTTC) or "Fibre-to-
the-Building/Home" (FTTB/H) and possibly also enhanced security and 
improved ability to distinguish among different "Quality of Service" (QoS) 
requirements. For cable networks, it is already often the case that the only 
voice service is IP-based, and the day is rapidly approaching where this will 
be the case for telephony networks as well. For mobile networks, the 
migration to IP voice is more complex. 
Where the access is evolving to FTTC/VDSL or FTTB/H, traditional 
remedies become difficult to apply. For VDSL, the natural point of 
interconnection (PoI) for purposes of network access moves from the MDF 
to the far more numerous street cabinets; however, access to street cabinets 
is potentially difficult and costly, calling into question the practicality of Local 
Loop Unbundling (LLU) as a competitive remedy. For fibre-based 
deployments to the building, many challenges exist regarding (access to) in-
building wiring, and uncertainties as to what might appropriately be done to 
unbundle "Passive Optical Network" (PON) solutions, again calling into 
question the practicality of LLU as a procompetitive regulatory remedy 4.  
                     
2 Indeed, technological neutrality is ostensibly a core tenet of European regulation. 
3 From a technical perspective, the architecture of an electronic communications network 
usually also includes a third layer, a so called "backhaul network" located in between the access 
network (in traditional networks called the local loop) and the core network. The migration to 
NGN actually affects all three layers: access, backhaul, and core network. This distinction can 
be ignored for the purposes of this paper. 
4 Bitstream access seems to be far less problematic in connection with VDSL and FTTB/H 
solutions; also point-to-point fibre introduces fewer problems with unbundling than PON 
architectures; however, with the migration to NGN, new network locations for bitstream access 
are likely as well as new "layers" for bitstream access (e.g. Ethernet). 
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In the NGN core, the migration to IP will serve to decouple the application 
from the (transport and control) network (layer), facilitating triple-play service 
provision and also enabling third party application service providers to 
compete with the operator of the physical network in the provision of 
services. At the NGN core, key regulatory challenges revolve around 
interconnection rather than access. The two are interrelated, but they are not 
at all the same. For purposes of this paper, interconnection can be viewed 
as the ability of one network operator to enable its customers to 
communicate with the customers of another network operator; access can 
instead be viewed as the use by one network operator of certain capabilities 
of another network operator as a component of the former's service, and in 
support of the former's customers. In other words, with access one operator 
effectively leases capacity from another. 
A range of additional regulatory issues have emerged, many of which are 
already present as IP becomes an increasingly central component of the 
architecture of the network: the degree to which access to emergency 
services should follow traditional models, the degree to which lawful 
intercept (authorized wiretapping in support of law enforcement and national 
security) should be supported, data retention issues, and so on. 
Different countries have considered these issues, but the pace of 
regulatory proceedings has been conditioned in each case by developments 
and market evolution in that country. In the UK, British Telecom (BT) is 
moving rapidly to replace the PSTN core entirely with an NGN core; 
however, little change is expected in the near term as regards the access 
network. In both the Netherlands and in Germany, the incumbents (KPN and 
DTAG) are moving rapidly to replace all (as in the Netherlands) or 
substantial parts (as in Germany) of the traditional fixed access network with 
a FTTC/VDSL-capable network. In France, the incumbent as well as its 
competitors are moving quickly to deploy FTTB/H in a number of major 
metropolitan areas. In Japan, FTTB/H deployment has been very successful, 
with many of the deployments undertaken by third parties other than the 
incumbents (NTT East and NTT West). In the U.S., incumbent operators 
AT&T (with FTTC) and Verizon (with FTTB) have made substantial 
investments in deploying fibre nearer to their respective customers. 
The results have also been diverse, reflecting differences in the 
respective markets, and also in the style and philosophy of the respective 
regulatory authorities. Within the European Union, these differences are 
likely to gradually converge over time. 
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The 2nd Section of this paper considers the various regulatory challenges 
that NGN raises at an overall, theoretical level. The 3rd Section considers 
market evolution and regulatory developments in five key arenas: the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. The 4th Section 
seeks to systematically compare the regulatory outcomes. The 2nd Section 
thus addresses what, in principle, should be done; the 3rd and 4th Sections 
discuss what has been done, with particular emphasis on access and 
interconnection. The last Section comprises our conclusions. 
  Regulatory challenges, regulatory goals 
This section considers the motivations for regulation of electronic 
communications, and the degree to which the evolution of the network to an 
IP-based NGN affects the realization of those objectives. There are a 
number of specific areas where it is generally accepted that public policy 
interventions are required to address needs that the market alone would not 
(HAYEK, 1945). These interventions generally fall in one of three categories: 
• Addressing distortions of competition, especially those caused by 
some form of market power; 
• Addressing social needs that the free market might not, typically 
because the social value exceeds the private value to parties that might 
otherwise invest; 
• Allocating scarce resources that are unique to each country 5.  
The migration to NGN implies numerous challenges to traditional 
regulation in all three of these areas: market power, public goods, and 
scarce resources. 
Market power 
As regards market power, one often hears claims that the evolution of the 
traditional networks to NGN based networks will eliminate the need to 
consider market power; however, the reality is considerably more complex. 
There are factors that suggest that market power might decline over time; 
                     
5 We have discussed this framework at greater length in several previous papers, including 
MARCUS & HAUCAP, November 2005. 
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there are aspects of market power that are unlikely to change much for the 
foreseeable future; and there are credible risks that new, troublesome forms 
of market power might emerge. It is impossible to predict at this stage which 
of these effects will predominate, but it is clearly premature to assume that 
market power will no longer be a concern. 
The ongoing market evolution has the potential to introduce new forms of 
infrastructure and/or service competition, and thereby to mitigate traditional 
market power. Unfortunately, some familiar forms of market power are likely 
to persist well into the future – most notably, access associated with last mile 
facilities, and with termination of voice telephone calls 6. Last mile facilities 
continue to be very expensive (sometimes prohibitively expensive) for new 
entrants to replicate. Civil engineering costs dominate when it comes to 
running a new connection to the cabinet, the building or the home, whether 
fibre or copper. Thus, access to already existing infrastructure (e.g. ducts of 
the incumbent or other market players; sewage pipes) which avoids digging 
is crucial. 
New technologies are creating new possibilities for last mile competition, 
but the last mile continues to represent a market segment with high initial 
cost and low marginal cost, where only a very limited number of 
telecommunications companies will find it cost-effective to create and 
maintain network infrastructure. 
Another instance where traditional market power is likely to carry forward 
is the termination monopoly. The termination monopoly is the ability of a 
network to demand surprisingly high termination fees in order to complete 
services, especially voice calls, to a device with a telephone number. Some 
have suggested that the migration to NGN will ameliorate the termination 
monopoly, due to the inherent routing capabilities of IP 7; unfortunately, this 
is a pipe dream. The termination monopoly exists because in general there 
is only a single service provider that is capable of terminating a voice 
telephone call to a given telephone number. The migration to NGN will not in 
and of itself change the termination monopoly at all. 
                     
6 See ERG, ERG Consultation Document on Regulatory Principles of NGA, (ERG (07) 16, 
2007. See also Ofcom, Regulatory challenges posed by next generation access networks, 23 
November 2006. 
7 See Gilbert-Tobin and CRA International, Economic study on IP interworking: White Paper, 
February 2007. 
24   No. 69, 1st Q. 2008 
Public goods: access to emergency services, lawful intercept 
Regulation today in most developed countries mandates that certain 
electronic communications service providers offer a number of capabilities 
that they would not be motivated to offer on their own initiative. Two notable 
examples that have featured prominently in the discussion of Voice over IP 
(VoIP) 8 in most countries are (1) access to emergency services, and (2) the 
ability to conduct lawful intercept (wiretapping). 
Access to emergency services is problematic because VoIP services 
need not be fixed to a single geographic location – they can easily move 
around. This nomadicity is somewhat different from mobility; the latter 
implies the ability for the end user to move (possibly at high speed) while a 
communications session is in progress, while the former denotes the more 
limited ability for the end user's location to change between sessions. 
Nonetheless, nomadicity poses profound challenges as regards access to 
emergency services, inasmuch as the existing solutions assume that fixed 
services are truly fixed. Emergency services need to know the caller's 
location, not only to send emergency response crews to the right address, 
but also to connect to the responders responsible for the caller's geographic 
area (the "Public Safety Answering Point", or PSAP) in the first place. 
Technical solutions are emerging; however, for the foreseeable future, 
access to emergency services on the part of nomadic VoIP users is likely to 
be subject to failure modes and inaccuracy. 
Lawful intercept represents another problematic case. Traditional 
solutions in the fixed network once again have tended to rely on the inherent 
characteristics of the PSTN. In an IP-based network, reliably capturing the 
right data, without needlessly compromising the privacy of other users, is 
likely to add expense and complexity. 
Scarce resources: numbering 
The migration to independent VoIP offerings, rather than the move to 
NGN generally, has raised concerns in the area of numbering. The use of 
telephone numbers has been quite contentious in Europe as VoIP has 
                     
8 In this paper we use the term VoIP in a very broad sense, i.e. it can be e.g. Voice over 
Broadband (with particular quality features) or Voice over (best effort) Internet. The crucial issue 
here is that a packet based infrastructure with a specific addressing and routing functionality is 
involved. 
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gained in prominence, but scarcely at all in the United States 9 due to 
differences in retail and wholesale pricing arrangements. In Europe, there 
has been much debate as to whether VoIP service providers should qualify 
for geographic numbers, and thus potentially for local calling rates 10. In 
many European countries, local calls are priced lower than national calls. 
  Many lands, many proceedings, many results 
The emergence of NGN is playing out differently in different countries. In 
some, it is primarily a migration of the core; in others, primarily a migration of 
the access network; and in still others, a migration of both core and access. 
This difference frames the regulatory discussion quite differently. At the 
same time, the countries that have had to deal with the issue first have 
regulatory authorities with somewhat different traditions from one another; 
moreover, the relationship between the national government and the historic 
incumbent operator is significantly different among these countries. 
All of these different circumstances, and probably others as well, have 
led to a different sequence of regulatory proceedings in different countries, 
and to different and sometimes conflicting decisions among them. 
In this chapter, we consider regulatory proceedings relevant to NGNs in 
the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, and the United States in that 
order. In the interest of brevity, we primarily address access and secondarily 
interconnection, leaving aside many other fascinating regulatory challenges. 
The United Kingdom (UK) 
In many respects, regulatory proceedings in the UK were the first to deal 
with issues of Next Generation Networks. BT's ambitious plans necessitated 
a comprehensive response on Ofcom's part. 
                     
9 The RBOCs raised the issue to the North American Numbering Council (NANC) a few years 
ago, but it was not felt to be a significant concern. 
10 A number of European countries introduced a specific non-geographic number range for 
VoIP calls. Consumers appear, however, to have a strong preference for geographic numbers. 
For more details see ELIXMANN, MARCUS & WERNICK (2008).  
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In 2004, British Telecom (BT) announced its intent to migrate its entire 
network to an IP-based Next Generation Network, the 21st Century Network 
(21CN) 11. The 21CN is a single IP and DWDM-based network that will carry 
both voice and data 12. In most respects, the technology that they intend to 
use (Dense Wave Division Multiplexing [DWDM], DiffServ, MPLS traffic 
engineering, and VoIP) is straightforward, mature and unadventurous. At 
another level, the initiative was rightly seen from the first as breathtaking, 
primarily for its scope. A rapid roll-out was envisioned for 21CN, coupled 
with a complete replacement of BT's PSTN operations in the UK. The actual 
pace of deployment has been notably more mellow, but is nonetheless 
impressive. BT hopes that this evolution will enable them to (1) transform the 
customer experience, (2) accelerate time-to-market for new services, and (3) 
eliminate about a billion British pounds per year in operating expense. 
The UK regulatory discussion entails an element that so far is nearly 
unique in European regulation (although the European Commission has 
recently proposed to make it a standard regulatory remedy): a set of 
agreements or undertakings between BT and Ofcom to largely separate 
BT's wholesale operations from its customer-facing retail operations, and to 
ensure that BT cannot discriminate against its wholesale customers (who 
are also its retail competitors) 13. BT made legally enforceable 
commitments 14 to provide a range of access services to competitors on a 
nondiscriminatory equivalence of input basis. Ofcom defines equivalence of 
input (EoI) as "[…] a requirement for BT to make available the same SMP 
products and services to others as it makes available to itself, at the same 
price, and using the same systems and processes". EoI obligations would be 
applicable "[…] when the cost is proportionate, and in particular [to] all new 
                     
11 BT's plans are extensively documented in various public documents, starting with their web 
site, at http://www.btplc.com/21CN/index.htm. 
12  See: 
http://www.btglobalservices.com/business/global/en/business/business_innovations/issue_02/c
entury_network.html. 
13 See: http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/news/2005/06/nr_20050623  
and: http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/telecoms_p2/statement/main.pdf.  
See also: Ofcom, 2005a. 
14 BT offered undertakings in lieu of a reference by Ofcom under the Enterprise Act. The 
undertakings are thus pursuant to competition law, and operate in a parallel and complementary 
fashion to Ofcom's ex ante sector-specific regulation. See: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/sec155/sec155.pdf.  
BT's commitments appear as Annex A to Ofcom's Strategic Review. 
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wholesale SMP products, processes and systems, and therefore to all new 
SMP products delivered over 21CN". 15  
BT has not been broken up, but a substantial "Chinese Wall" has been 
established between BT's Openreach access services division and the rest 
of BT. Openreach has a separate management team with substantial 
autonomy, and some 30,000 employees who have their own uniforms and 
their own branding. Notably, their bonus plans are based on Openreach 
objectives, and are decoupled from the price of BT group stock. An Equality 
of Access Board monitors Openreach's compliance with its commitments to 
provide equality of access 16.  
From a public policy perspective, this is a promising but still unproven 
approach. To the extent that Functional Separation is effective, the provision 
of wholesale services on a nondiscriminatory basis should be self-enforcing, 
thus easing the burden on the regulator and also providing BT with greater 
flexibility to respond to market demands. Many feel that it is a promising way 
to side-step a range of regulatory issues as the network evolves to an NGN. 
At the same time, many open questions remain as to how effective these 
arrangements will prove to be over time; the degree to which information 
about BT OpenReach's wholesale customers' plans will really be kept 
confidential from the portions of BT that compete with those wholesale 
customers; and whether this fairly intensive and intrusive remedy is really 
warranted. 
The UK is unusually liberal in its policies toward geographic telephone 
numbers. UK numbers are not strongly tied to a particular geographic 
location, nor for that matter to the UK. This has been a boon to providers of 
"nomadic" VoIP service – services that can be utilized from a location other 
than the user's home location. The UK also provides for non-geographic 
numbers, but in the UK – as elsewhere in Europe – there is negligible 
demand for non-geographic numbers for standard consumer VoIP services.   
Ofcom has conducted a vast number of regulatory consultations that are 
linked to BT's migration to NGN. Key themes of these consultations have 
been access and interconnection arrangements; changes in BT's Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (WACC); and joint planning between BT and its 
competitors during the migration. Taken as a whole, the interconnection 
                     
15 Ofcom, 2005b (hereinafter Further Consultation), section 1.21. 
16 See: http://www.openreach.co.uk/orpg/aboutus/aregulatedbusiness.do. 
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discussion in the UK has been surprisingly "retro", largely focussed on 
narrowband voice interconnection in the context of traditional Calling Party's 
Network Pays (CPNP) arrangements. 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the incumbent (KPN) intends to rapidly phase out 
existing access arrangements in favour of FTTC/VDSL deployments. The 
migration is to be funded in large part by revenues generated by selling 
central offices (Main Distribution Frame locations) that will no longer be 
needed. Much of the discussion in the Netherlands has centred on this 
drastic proposed reduction in the number of access locations, and on its 
implications in terms of stranded investment on the part of alternative 
operators. KPN's current network infrastructure in the Netherlands consists 
of about 28,000 street cabinets and about 1,350 Main Distribution Frames 
(MDFs). Figure 1 provides a high level view of the new All-IP network that 
KPN is about to introduce in the Netherlands 17. KPN's All-IP network will 
consist of five distinct network layers: the access network (local loop), the 
metro access network, the metro core network, the backbone, and the IP-
Edge network. 
The original network deployment plan comprises the following features: 
the existing copper loop between the cabinet and the Main Distribution 
Frame (MDF) will be replaced or overbuilt by fibre. The number of street 
cabinets will remain constant at about 28,000, but street cabinets will now 
contain new devices, NG-DSLAMs, that can provide voice, video and data in 
an integrated way (thus becoming Multi-Service Access Nodes [MSANs]). 
The street cabinets will be linked to presumably less than 200 Metro Core 
Locations (MCLs) placed at former MDF locations. The remaining roughly 
1,150 MDF locations will no longer be needed. KPN intends to close down 
these locations and to sell the real estate in order to fund the transition. 
OPTA, the regulator for the Netherlands, initially proposed that KPN (1) 
issue a reference offer for sub-loop unbundling; (2) that KPN not phase out 
any location without prior notice to concerned parties, with a reasonable 
transition period for each location; (3) that KPN must continue to offer 
access at all locations, but could limit the duration in the case of facilities that 
were scheduled to be phased out. 
                     
17 The following information rests on OPTA (2006). 
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Figure 1 - Overview of KPN's planned ALL-IP network 
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A subsequent consultant's study called into question the economic 
viability of sub-loop unbundling from the street cabinet. Indeed, a competitor 
would have needed much higher market share than could be realistically 
expected and/or would have had to be able to increase substantially the 
Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) due to new services and higher 
available bandwidths. Consequently, OPTA has essentially abandoned (for 
the time being) its announced intention to publish policy rules for the phasing 
out of local loop unbundling from Main Distribution Frames (MDF access) 18.  
OPTA then called on KPN to produce a solution that would be acceptable 
to all of the parties concerned. On July 15, 2007, KPN and its competitors 
bbned, Orange and Tele2 signed Memoranda of Understanding "on the 
principles governing the conditions under which they are prepared to 
cooperate – in due time – in the phasing out of KPN's MDF locations".  In 
these MoUs, KPN agreed to maintain MDF access for competitors at the 138 
                     
18 OPTA argues that permitting KPN to withdraw MDF access would only be conceivable if 
market entry possibilities and the continuity of service provision by alternative operators would 
be sufficiently guaranteed. However, they came to the conclusion that the alternative solutions 
to MDF access (proposed at that time) might not be sufficient to enable meaningful competition 
to KPN. 
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currently planned Metro Core Locations and at about 35 other MDF 
locations. The objective had been to reach agreements by December 15, 
2007 with the other market participants, and to further elaborate the existing 
MoUs with bbned, Orange and Tele2; however, this target was not met as of 
the end of 2007.  
On February 6, 2008, KPN announced a revised MDF migration 
agreement. After a roundtable discussion on February 7, 2008 with OPTA 
and all market participants involved, it was agreed that the current MDF 
related services will be maintained until the middle of 2010, that there will be 
an improved offering regarding large quality wholesale broadband access, 
and that a substantial share of MDF locations will be available for unbundled 
access. Moreover, OPTA has asked market participants to also discuss 
alternatives like Ethernet access on fibre and interconnecting leased lines 
(interconnecterende huurlijnen).  
Germany 
The German discussion has also centred on the question of access 
arrangements in a future NGN based on FTTC/VDSL deployment. In 
Germany, rather short average loop length to the customer (below 400 m) 
makes VDSL a very workable technical proposition. Interconnection has also 
featured prominently in the German discussion. These access arrangements 
enable a drastic reduction in the number of Points of Interconnection (PoIs). 
DTAG's current network consists of about 7,900 Main Distribution 
Frames (MDFs) which are entirely accessible on the basis of fibre, and 
about 290,000 street cabinets. This corresponds to approximately 40 
cabinets per MDF. In Germany, the average number of access lines per 
cabinet is less than 200. DTAG's biggest competitors currently have access 
to about 3,000 MDFs, representing a coverage of 70 to 80% of the German 
population. In 2005, DTAG announced plans to deploy fibre between the 
MDF and the street cabinet (FTTC), and to install VDSL solutions. 
Geographically, the company will focus these deployments on densely 
populated areas. As of January 2007, the network deployment covered 12 
metropolitan areas with about 5.9 million potential customers. Based on its 
original plans, DTAG aims to deploy fibre in Germany's 50 biggest cities by 
2008.  
DTAG has committed to make these investments only if the German 
government provides a "regulatory holiday" from the obligations to which 
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DTAG would otherwise be subject to offer wholesale services to competitors 
at regulated prices based on these new VDSL capabilities. DTAG has 
argued that its investment warrants protection from regulation because "new 
products" like IPTV are offered over VDSL. This lobbying has been 
successful in Germany 19, but has had no traction with the European 
Commission. The proposal is dead at the European level 20. To date, the 
German regulator (BNetzA) has not imposed unbundling obligations on 
DTAG VDSL deployments; they did, however, impose the obligation to make 
ducts available from the central office to the street cabinet.  
This is a complicated game, which will likely take two or three years to 
play out. As we write this paper in the beginning of 2008, there is no 
effective competitive access to DTAG's VDSL infrastructure; however, 
German competitors are discussing the conditions under which there might 
be a viable business case for deploying their own FTTC/VDSL infrastructure. 
Moreover, at least one carrier (NetCologne, the regional carrier active in 
Cologne) has initiated a far-reaching FTTB deployment. NetCologne's 
business case rests on savings in ULL fees that they would otherwise have 
paid to DTAG for access to the local loop. Their fees will be eliminated once 
NetCologne's FTTB network is complete.   
In regard to the use of telephone numbers by IP-based voice services, 
Germany has made geographic numbers available, but only where the user 
has a relationship (for example, a residence or a business) to the geographic 
area in question. As in the UK, non-geographic numbers are available, but 
consumer demand is negligible. 
The European Commission's proposals  
under the review of the regulatory framework 
The Commission proposed changes to the European regulatory 
framework on 13 November 2007. These changes touch on a number of 
NGN issues. 
                     
19 A specific clause has been added to the telecommunications law which can be applied to 
grant a regulatory holiday to DTAG. 
20 The Commission has launched an infringement procedure against Germany the outcome of 
which is still pending. 
32   No. 69, 1st Q. 2008 
In regard to last mile access, the Commission chose to stay the course.  
They did not propose major changes. The recommendations reemphasize 
the importance of technological neutrality. In the Explanatory Note to the 
Commission's revised list of markets where ex ante regulation might be 
appropriate, the Commission notes once again that, while the dial-up 
Internet access market seems to be distinct from broadband Internet access, 
they see no basis for treating VDSL or other fibre-based access as a distinct 
market from other broadband Internet access. They thus reject once again 
the "regulatory holiday" that the German government has advocated. 
There have been calls to implement regulation at European level to 
prevent network operators from discriminating in favour of affiliated content 
or affiliated applications, and against other content or applications. The 
debate over this issue (known as network neutrality) in Europe largely 
reflects concerns over potential anticompetitive discrimination that have 
been expressed in the United States in recent years. In our view, network 
neutrality is unlikely to emerge as such an intense issue in Europe as it has 
in the U.S, because (1) competition in European broadband markets, which 
is far more robust than in the U.S., will tend to inhibit anticompetitive acts, 
and (2) European regulation is better suited to deal with potential problems 
than U.S. regulation 21. The European Commission apparently reached 
similar conclusions, and declined to implement comprehensive network 
neutrality regulation; instead, they implemented more modest regulatory 
protections to ensure that consumers must be informed to the extent that 
network operators disfavour or block access to certain content or 
applications, and to prevent network operators from erecting barriers to 
switching providers if consumers are dissatisfied. 
The 13 November 2007 proposals would also require providers of VoIP 
services to conventional national or international phone numbers to provide 
access to emergency services. 
Japan 
Japan is by far the country with the highest FTTB/H penetration in the 
world (more than 10 million at the end of 2007). Some of the recent growth 
in FTTB/H has come at the expense of DSL, as customers migrate from 
                     
21 See MARCUS (January 2008). Also See:  
http://www.springerlink.com/content/g37k162urx11/?p=1a363b658dfb4d95accaecba21b38d5f&pi=0. 
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"traditional" broadband to ultra-high-speed FTTB/H. DSL still is the most 
important access technology; however, for the largest operator, fibre-optic 
networks have overtaken ADSL lines as NTT's most popular broadband 
internet access method. ADSL subscribers fell for the first time since the 
introduction of ADSL in 2000, down 360,000 in 2006 to 5.32 million. 
Meanwhile, during the same period, 2.66 million fibre-optic users were 
added.  
In Japan, many players are active in the field of providing FTTB/H access 
services to end users. It is not only carriers (NTT-East, NTT-West, and 
KDDI), but also electric power companies, cable television operators, 
content providers, municipal and regional governments, and ISPs (Yahoo! 
Broadband being a conspicuous example of this last category). Japan has 
implemented fairly aggressive unbundling obligations for incumbent fibre; 
however, there are indications that most actual deployment is being built out 
by competitors on their own. Part of the dynamic of fibre deployment in 
Japan might also reflect the fact that aerial deployment is widely used for the 
fibre link to the end-user's building or home.  
The Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) has 
initiated several studies relevant to regulatory responses to the emergence 
of NGN, one dealing with competition rules, and another with technical 
architecture. 
The "Study Group on a Framework for Competition Rules to Address the 
Transition to IP-Based Networks" developed a framework for an 
interconnection and tariff policy, and issued its final report in September 
2006 (MIC, 2006). They identified the preservation of fair competition as a 
key goal, particularly as network operators become more vertically 
integrated. They saw competitive and technological neutrality as vital, and 
sought to protect the interests of consumers through competition rules that 
are flexible, transparent and consistent. 
They also advocated three key principles that are closely related to calls 
for wired and wireless network neutrality that have recently been in evidence 
in the U.S.: (1) IP-based networks should be accessible to users and easy to 
use, allowing access to content and application layers; (2) IP-based 
networks should be accessible and available to any terminal that meets the 
relevant technical standards, and should support end-to-end 
telecommunications; and (3) Users should be provided with equality of 
access to telecommunications and platform layers at a reasonable price. 
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The MIC has also convened a "Study Group on Network Architecture" 
(MIC, 2006). The group is to evaluate the technical evolution of NGNs, the 
socioeconomic implications, and the relationships to standards and to the 
overall research and development process. 
The United States 
It is rare to hear NGN discussed as such in the United States; however, 
the evolution of the access network as fibre migrates closer to the end-user 
is not much different from that in Europe or Japan. Consequently, it raises 
the same issues. The regulatory response, however, has been completely 
different. The United States FCC has withdrawn nearly all regulatory 
obligations on network access as regards not only fibre, but also wired 
copper broadband Internet access (MARCUS, 2005). A previously effective 
program of shared access has been withdrawn. The only remaining remedy 
relevant to broadband access is Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) for copper 
lines (not for fibre); unfortunately, as European experience has richly 
demonstrated, that is not enough to maintain a robust ladder of investment. 
The FCC has claimed that the wholesale market for DSL and cable 
modem Internet access services was effective, and would remain so in the 
absence of regulation (FCC, 2005, especially paragraph 75). The FCC's own 
data flatly contradict this view, which show third party (CLEC) DSL declining 
to 3.1% of all DSL lines as of December 2006. The third party access 
provided by cable operators is negligible. 
The U.S. is blessed with extensive cable television infrastructure, and the 
cable operators were heavily engaged in broadband access before the 
telephone incumbents; in consequence, the withdrawal of regulation has 
resulted, not in monopoly, but in a series of non-geographically overlapping 
duopolies. The results must be viewed as mixed at best. The U.S. has seen 
strong investment in fibre access by incumbents, and steady improvements 
in cable plant, but negligible investment (or disinvestment) on the part of 
competitors. Broadband penetration and the price/performance of offers are 
reasonable, but probably nowhere near what might have been expected 
given the ubiquity of cable television and the enormous head start that the 
U.S. once had. 
Numbering has been a fairly minor issue in the United States, largely 
because termination rates for geographic, non-geographic and mobile 
numbers are not markedly different from one another. This is largely a result 
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of efficient U.S. voice telephony interconnection arrangements, which 
preclude large asymmetries in the wholesale price for terminating a voice 
telephone call. Geographic numbers are only loosely tied to a geographic 
area, or for that matter to the United States. 
  Similarities and differences 
Both differences and similarities are visible in the regulatory outcomes 
among the countries that we have reviewed. The differences are conditioned 
primarily on differences in market evolution. Differences in regulatory style, 
and in the degree of government ownership of the incumbent, have 
apparently also played a role. Nonetheless, a number of common threads 
emerge. It is helpful to begin by reviewing the differences in network 
evolution, starting with the access network and proceeding to the core 
network. In each country, issues of access and interconnection have played 
a key role, but access has been central to the access network, while 
interconnection has been a concern in the core. 
The access network 
The access network poses serious challenges to the regulator. Is it more 
important to stimulate investment, or to ensure competition? Are these goals 
compatible, or in conflict? Ensuring competition and choice, and avoiding 
restriction of competition, are largely viewed as demanding aggressive 
procompetitive regulation; however, it is recognized that this regulation may 
inhibit investment on the part of incumbents. It is not unusual to hear a 
European regulator lament that he or she would like to encourage 
investment, but not at the cost of re-monopolization of the network. 
Most European regulators feel (as do the authors of this paper) that a 
simple withdrawal of regulation is not the most appropriate answer, not only 
because it risks restricting consumer choice and inhibiting competition, but 
also because it likely inhibits investments on the part of competitive entrants 
(which quantitatively are often just as significant as those made by 
incumbents). 
VDSL tends to be the technology of choice in a number of countries, 
especially where there are short local loops from the street cabinet to the 
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customer premises. VDSL has been the access technology of choice in 
Germany and the Netherlands, but not in France or Japan. Japan has 
emphasized high end FTTB/FTTH solutions. France, largely as a result of 
rather long loop lengths, has focused on FTTB/FTTH solutions. The UK is 
effectively in a third category: BT is moving rapidly to modernize its core 
network, but relatively little is happening in the access network other than 
ongoing migration to more conventional broadband. 
Access issues have been an intense topic of discussion in all of these 
countries. Deployment of FTTC/VDSL effectively relocates the Point of 
Interconnection from the Main Distribution Frame to the street cabinet, 
making unbundled access potentially much more difficult and costly. FTTH 
involves complex building wiring issues, and difficulties unbundling PON 
solutions. Unbundled access and shared access (but not necessarily 
bitstream access) consequently face substantial challenges in a VDSL 
and/or FTTB/H world. 
The regulatory outcomes are as diverse as the inputs. 
In the Netherlands, regulation of VDSL is still evolving, but it seems clear 
that the OPTA will insist that some effective portfolio of access modes 
(comprising access at the cabinet, access at the MDF, and bitstream 
access) equivalent to loop unbundling at the MDF will remain in effect.  
In Japan, FTTB/H deployments are fully subject to unbundling 
requirements; however, it is unclear how effective the obligations have been 
in practice. Unbundling of copper and fibre in the backhaul network was 
hugely important to ADSL competition; FTTH, however, is often being rolled 
out by competitors in areas with high teledensity using the competitive 
operator's own dedicated facilities. 
The German government chose in essence to deregulate VDSL facilities 
in order to encourage investment on the part of DTAG, and are consequently 
subject to infringement proceedings by the European Commission; the 
regulator has however attempted to find a more delicate balance, seeking to 
make access to ducts available to competitors, and thus to provide 
competitive access to the street cabinet in a different way.  
In the UK, there has been much discussion of the role of public policy in 
promoting enhanced broadband access, but little actual deployment; 
however, the Ofcom/BT Functional Separation arrangements arguably 
address the problem in a different way, reducing BT's incentives to 
J.S. MARCUS & D. ELIXMANN 37 
discriminate against competitors. LLU has surged in the UK, perhaps as a 
result of Functional Separation. There has been much interest in Functional 
Separation in the past few years, but results to date are still preliminary. 
In all of these countries there has been intense discussion of the location 
and number of Points of Interconnect (PoIs) associated with access, and the 
rapidity with which current PoIs could be phased out. It is generally 
recognized that the incumbent should not be obliged to maintain obsolete 
PoIs any longer than necessary, but that it is nonetheless important that 
there be appropriate consultation with competitors and that there be 
appropriate notice periods when PoIs are withdrawn by the incumbent. 
Finally, in the U.S., there has been progressive withdrawal of 
procompetitive regulation, with the subsequent predictable collapse of third 
party competitors. This has stimulated investment by incumbents, but 
suppressed investment by competitors. There are few objective sources of 
analysis for the U.S., but our sense is that the net impact on overall welfare 
has been negative and substantial. The adverse consequences are 
mitigated somewhat by strong presence of cable television as a provider of 
broadband Internet access. 
The core network 
The NGN core network raises somewhat different challenges. At the top 
of the regulatory agenda have been issues of interconnection. It is generally 
accepted that wholesale payments based on Minutes of Use will make less 
and less sense in the fixed network going forward. They are only weakly 
correlated to real average incremental cost; the direction of termination or 
origination was largely irrelevant in the current network, and can be trivially 
manipulated; and there are measurement challenges and risks of gaming 
and arbitrage. 
Voice services in the fixed network will be subject to intense competition 
from third party VoIP service providers. It is likely, however, that mobile 
interconnection arrangements for voice traffic will migrate more slowly to an 
IP basis than in the fixed network. Mobile operators derive far more 
wholesale revenue from interconnection than do their fixed counterparts, and 
also have far more ability to hinder the migration from switched voice to VoIP 
voice. The authors feel that current interconnection fees are much too high, 
especially for calls to mobile networks, and that they are inflating retail prices 
in ways unrelated to cost, and depressing use. The migration to IP has the 
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potential to force changes to inefficient European arrangements, but fixed 
and mobile operators appear to be both willing and able to slow the natural 
network evolution. We see these trends as troubling (MARCUS, ELIXMANN 
et al., 2008).  
There has been some tendency in the discussion, and also in the 
literature, to blur together the discussion of PoIs for access and for 
interconnection. The number of PoIs needed for IP-based interconnection is 
probably an order of magnitude less than the number of PoIs needed for 
access – probably somewhere between three and ten for a European 
Member State. Again, the incumbent should be able to migrate its PoIs over 
time, but with reasonable consultation with competitors and with appropriate 
notice periods. 
In an IP-based network, the telephone numbering plan is not a matter of 
the network, but rather of the applications that run on top of the network. The 
change in the technical locus of numbering does not eliminate market power 
concerns; thus numbering will continue to be a critical issue. 
Arrangements across Europe are highly diverse. Some Member States 
permit IP-based telephony service providers to use geographic numbers, 
some permit them to use non-geographic numbers, and some permit both. 
Some provide full flexibility in the use of geographic numbers, while others 
require a link to the area with which the geographic number is associated. 
This is an area where there are substantial opportunities to increase 
harmonisation across the European Union 22.  
  Conclusions 
The deployment of NGN technology is increasingly becoming a market 
reality throughout the world. Technically, NGNs fundamentally change the 
architecture and the topology of the current electronic communications 
networks. They decouple the functionality associated with the transport, 
control, and provision of applications and services. This decoupling enables 
                     
22 Differences of the regulatory environment across Member States do play a crucial role also 
and in particular for pan-European VoIP business models inasmuch as they represent far 
reaching economic hurdles, thus, impeding market entry. See ELIXMANN, MARCUS & 
WERNICK (2008). 
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a multitude of new business models to evolve that differ with regard to the 
degree of integration of transport, control, and service provision. 
These changes introduce new possibilities for competition that could in 
time mitigate the need for certain kinds of regulation; at the same time, the 
migration to NGN raises new regulatory challenges. In the near to 
intermediate term, we do not expect regulation to wither away. The 
requirements for regulation due to the migration to NGN are notably different 
regarding for the NGN access network compared to the NGN core network.  
In the access network, a regulatory response to last mile wired market 
power will continue to be appropriate in most geographic regions of most 
countries for the foreseeable future; however, the challenges posed to the 
implementation of loop unbundling by the migration to FTTC/VSDL and by 
FTTB/FTTH raise serious and as yet unresolved questions as to how this 
might best be achieved. Experimentation in different countries is likely to 
shed light as to whether some combination of access to street cabinets (sub-
loop unbundling), access to rights of way, access to ducts, and/or access to 
building wiring might be sufficient to maintain the effectiveness of loop 
unbundling and shared access (as a ladder-of-investment complement to 
bitstream access). International comparative assessment in the years to 
come should also shed light as to the real costs and benefits of the radical 
deregulation practiced in the U.S. 
Many issues impact the core network, but the most notable by far is 
interconnection. Given that the termination monopoly will persist, we feel 
once again that some degree of continued regulation will be necessary. The 
migration to NGN will place enormous strain on existing interconnection 
arrangements, and will make more obvious the distortions that are already 
inherent in interconnection arrangements in most countries. Also, existing 
call termination rates are at inefficiently high levels (MARCUS, ELIXMANN 
et al., 2008).  
Migration to NGN will be carried out gradually. For an extended period, 
which could easily exceed ten years, old circuit switched networks will 
coexist with new packet-based infrastructures. Thus, a crucial task for 
regulation is to set appropriate incentives and to avoid distortions during the 
migration period. Challenges that have already emerged include how long to 
maintain regulated access to locations that the incumbent would like to 
phase out, and how to establish an appropriate glide path for price regulation 
during the migration. Reasonably good solutions have appeared in a number 
of countries, but issues will surely continue to arise. 
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